Securing interactions between devices that do not know each other a priori is an important and challenging task. We present Amigo, a technique to authenticate co-located devices using knowledge of their shared radio environment as proof of physical proximity. We present evaluation results that show that our technique is robust against a range of passive and active attacks. The key advantages of our technique are that it does not require any additional hardware to be present on the devices beyond the radios that are already used for communication, it does not require user involvement to verify the validity of the authentication process, and it is not vulnerable to eavesdropping.
Introduction
With the increased adoption of mobile devices, spontaneous communication between wireless devices that come within proximity of each other but lack a pre-existing trust relationship will become common. For example, patrons at a bar, guests at a party or conference participants will use their mobile phones to exchange private contact information over Bluetooth or WiFi. Consumers may use their mobile devices as electronic wallets to pay for tickets at the train station or groceries at the store. Users will take advantage of resources available in the environment by pairing their mobile phones with public full-sized displays and keyboards (Barton et al., 2006) , or share music by pairing their phone with a friend's home entertainment system.
An important precondition for the widespread proliferation of spontaneous communication among wireless devices is securing these interactions against eavesdropping, impostors, and man-in-the-middle attacks, in which an attacker reads and inserts messages between two parties without either party knowing that the channel between them has been compromised. Obviously, users would not want their private contact or banking information to be overheard or tampered with by a malicious third party.
We refer to the problem of securing the communication between devices in proximity as secure pairing. Unfortunately, traditional cryptographic techniques, such as the Diffie-Hellman protocol (Diffie and Hellman, 1976) , by themselves are not sufficient for securely pairing devices that spontaneously come into wireless contact. Whereas they provide a secure binding of keys to electronic identifiers, such as network addresses or device names, these techniques cannot guarantee that the two devices that the user holds in their hands are in fact the ones that are paired -an attacker hundreds of meters away with a directional antenna could be impersonating the device name or network address. What is required is a natural way to ensure that the keys obtained through the cryptographic exchange belong indeed to devices that are within physical proximity.
This paper shows that it is possible to securely pair devices that come within close proximity by deriving a shared secret from dynamic characteristics of their common radio environment. This approach takes advantage of three observations. First, many mobile devices come equipped with radios that can sense their immediate radio environment. Second, devices in close proximity that simultaneously monitor a common set of ambient radio sources, e.g., WiFi access points or cell phone base stations, perceive a similar radio environment. For high frequency radio technologies, receivers only a few centimeters away may perceive different radio environments due to multi-path effects; however, these differences are generally small compared to differences perceived by receivers at larger distances. Third, due to environmental factors the radio channel varies in unpredictable ways over short time scales. For example, at a single location, signal strength from a cell phone base station fluctuates from one moment to the next, but devices in close proximity perceive similar fluctuations.
Together, these observations imply that it is possible for devices in close proximity to derive a common radio profile that is specific to a particular location and time. This paper shows that this profile can be used to securely pair devices in close proximity by using knowledge of their common radio environment as proof of physical proximity.
We describe Amigo, a technique that extends the Diffie-Hellman key exchange with verification of device co-location. Initially, the two devices perform a Diffie-Hellman key exchange in order to derive a shared-secret. After this exchange alone, it is not possible for either device to be sure whether it shares a secret with the other co-located device or with some potentially malicious third party. Next, both devices monitor their radio environment for a short period of time and exchange a signature of that environment with the other device. Finally, each device independently verifies that the received signature and its own signature are similar enough to conclude that the two devices are in proximity. The verification takes into consideration both transmissions received by the devices and perceived signal strength fluctuations.
An evaluation conducted using WiFi-enabled laptops shows that without requiring user interaction, Amigo can recognise an attacker located as close as 3 m away. However, if the user is willing to create some localised entropy in the radio environment by, for example, walking or waving their hand in front of the antennas of the two co-located devices, Amigo can detect an attacker located as close as 20 cm away, and can defeat a powerful attacker that has surveyed the environment and has control over ambient radio sources.
Amigo has three advantages over existing solutions:
• it requires no additional hardware to be present on the devices besides the standard wireless radio already available on most devices
• in most cases, it requires no user involvement (beyond specifying that the devices are to be paired)
• because devices determine co-location by listening to their radio environment, as opposed to transmitting, Amigo is immune to eavesdropping attacks.
Problem definition and threat model
We define the problem of secure pairing of devices in close proximity as follows. Two devices that are located nearby (within 1 m) to each other but do not know each other a priori need to establish a channel between them that is both secure and authentic. A secure channel implies that no eavesdropper may intercept and decrypt messages between the endpoints, while authenticity requires that both endpoints are able to confirm the identity of the other. We assume that the devices can communicate over compatible wireless radios (e.g., WiFi). We assume the presence of an attacker that will try to pair with one or both of the legitimate devices. We assume that the attacker is located beyond the distance that separates the two legitimate devices, and can sense the wireless environment, inject new traffic, and replay packets. Moreover, we assume that the attacker has surveyed the location where the two legitimate devices are attempting to pair. The attacker can use this knowledge to convince the legitimate devices that they are co-located by predicting the perceived signal strength of ambient radio sources at the location and time of pairing. In the most extreme case, we assume that the attacker both knows what packets were heard by the legitimate device and has access to distributions of signal strengths for each radio source as received by the legitimate device at the time and location of pairing. This is a best-case scenario for the attacker who, even with full control over ambient radio sources, would at best be able to transmit packets at known power levels and predict which packets were received by the legitimate device and at what signal strengths.
We consider two kinds of possible attacks: An impostor attack where the attacker succeeds in disabling one of the co-located devices and attempts to impersonate it; and a man-in-the-middle attack where the attacker attempts to pair with the two co-located devices simultaneously, and hides its presence by relaying authentication traffic between them.
Secure pairing of devices in physical proximity
In this section, we describe our algorithm to authenticate co-located devices using measurements of their shared radio environment as proof of physical proximity. Our solution is based on the observation that due to environmental effects it is very hard to predict fluctuations in the radio environment at a specific location and at a specific time without being physically present at that location at that time. On the other hand, devices that are positioned in proximity not only tend to successfully decode radio transmissions from the same sources, but also perceive similar fluctuations in signal strength. We will show how this common radio environment can be used as a basis of an authentication scheme for co-located devices.
The Diffie-Hellman protocol allows two parties to create a shared secret key that can be used to secure future communications. While the protocol cannot be compromised by eavesdropping, it is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks by a third party. The protocol also does not provide any assurances as to the identity or the proximity of the devices that end up pairing. To both protect the protocol against man-in-the-middle attacks and to ensure that the pairing actually happens with a device in close proximity (as opposed to a distant attacker with a sensitive antenna), we extended the Diffie-Hellman key exchange with a co-location verification stage.
In our scheme, after the two devices perform a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, each device monitors the radio environment for a short period of time and generates a signature, which includes a sequence of packet identifiers 1 and the signal strength at which the packets were received. This signature is then transmitted to the other device over the secure channel via a commitment scheme intended to secure the pairing against a man-in-the-middle attack. Finally, each node independently verifies that the received signature and its own signature are similar enough to conclude that the two devices are co-located. At the end of the verification, each device either accepts the signature or rejects it. Because the signatures are used only to validate the keys being exchanged, but not as the basis for encryption, the signatures do not have to remain secret once the authentication takes place. The only requirement on the signatures is that they have to be hard to guess during the authentication phase.
Next, we present our co-location verification algorithm and describe our commitment scheme which is designed to prevent a man-in-the-middle attack.
Co-location verification algorithm
The problem of co-location verification can be described as follows. Given a signature captured locally by a device A, and a signature received from a device B, A needs to reach a binary decision as to whether B is co-located or not. For A to conclude that B is co-located, the signature received from B should be sufficiently similar to the signature captured locally. The verification algorithm has four stages: temporal alignment, slicing, feature extraction and classification. This process is shown in Figure 1 .
Since the two devices capture packets locally, they may have started capturing packets at slightly different moments. To meaningfully compare sequences of packet identifiers and signal strength measurements, they need to be temporally aligned. The verification algorithm begins by aligning the packet sequences using the first common packet identifier and discarding all preceding elements in each sequence.
Once the signatures are temporally aligned, we slice them into smaller consecutive subsequences of a fixed timespan, known as segments. Slicing allows the verification algorithm to first give a similarity score to each pair of aligned segments and then combine these scores into a final classification decision. Using segments of one second in length typically allows enough packets to be observed for good performance while still keeping the protocol responsive.
The verification algorithm then extracts a set of features from each of the resulting aligned segment pairs. Each feature captures a particular relationship between the two segments to be used by the classification algorithm. For example, percentage of packets that are common to both segments is a useful feature because a higher percentage is associated with a higher likelihood that the two devices are co-located. We describe the set of features used by our classifier in Section 4.2. We further refer to a set of features extracted from a pair of segments as an instance.
Finally, we feed the set of instances (one for each segment) into a classifier, which gives a decision as to whether the two signatures have been captured by co-located devices.
The classifier
We distinguish instances generated by co-located devices from instances generated by non co-located devices using a two stage boosted binary stump classifier. The first stage was added in order to filter noisy data before the more complex binary stump classifier, allowing effective training with less data. During the first stage, instances that have less than a minimum percentage of packets in common are marked as invalid; these are treated in a special way at the end of the second stage. Instances with a low percentage of packets in common (which occur much more commonly with non co-located pairs) were found to have very high classification error. We found experimentally that a threshold of 75% works well.
In the second stage, valid instances are assigned a score, referred to as a margin. A margin is derived by evaluating a set of simple functions on an instance and combining the results in a weighted-sum. A sample margin calculation is shown in Figure 2 . A larger positive margin indicates more confidence that the devices are co-located. A lower negative margin indicates more confidence that the devices are not co-located. A margin near zero indicates a lack of confidence about the decision. 
Finally, the classification algorithm aggregates a window of margins and makes a prediction. Windowing allows the classifier to tolerate a lower degree of accuracy with each individual instance classification. The decision for each window is made with a simple voting scheme. We convert margins into votes based on an adjustable margin threshold; margins that are higher than the threshold are converted to TRUE votes and margins that are below the threshold are converted to FALSE votes. Instances that are marked as invalid do not contribute any vote. At the end, if the window contains a majority of TRUE votes, the devices are classified as co-located. Excessive invalid instances or a majority of FALSE votes will cause the classified to be classified as not co-located. In Section 4.5, we show that the margin threshold of four works well in practice and, in Section 4.3, we evaluate the effect of the window size on the classification accuracy.
In order to train the classifier, appropriate features, constants and weights for the margin calculation must be selected. This process is discussed in Section 4.2.
Dealing with a man-in-the-middle attack
In order to deal with a man-in-the-middle attack, our algorithm employs a simple commitment scheme. The trace collection is broken into short periods of a fixed duration during which a device captures one block of data. The devices are required to exchange the blocks at the end of each time period, otherwise the pairing is rejected. Before sending a block, a device concatenates the block with a hash of its Diffie-Hellman session key and its device identifier, encrypts the result using a nonce value and sends this encrypted block to the other device. Concatenation of the session key is required to prevent the attacker from simply forwarding blocks back and forth between the co-located devices as explained below, and concatenation of the device identifier prevents the attacker from simply 'mirroring' the messages. After all blocks have been transferred, both devices exchange the set of nonces required to decrypt the sequence of encrypted blocks and verify the hashes of the session keys and device identifiers.
At the end of each time period, the attacker is required to supply a block. Since the attacker cannot decrypt received blocks until the end of the collection process, he has only two choices. The attacker can either pass on the encrypted block received from a co-located device or can generate a new block with its own session key. Since the session keys between the attacker and each co-located device are different, simply passing the encrypted blocks between devices will not allow the attacker to pair with either of the devices. In Section 4, we show that trying to forge new packets based on the radio environment is also likely to be fruitless, unless the attacker is very close to the co-located devices.
This scheme is equivalent to a fixed-delay interlock protocol (Rivest and Shamir, 1984) . The nonce used to decrypt the blocks can be sent one collection period after the encrypted blocks. However, unlike the fixed-delay interlock protocol, it is not necessary to use the delays to simply detect a man-in-the-middle; after the relevant time period has passed, each block becomes useless, as they are strictly time-dependent. The attacker cannot extract useful information from any block in order to pass it to a target when it is required. The nature of the secrets implicitly detects a man-in-the-middle by forcing him to generate a fake signature.
Evaluation
In this section, we first discuss our data collection and training procedures, then we proceed to evaluate the performance of Amigo under various conditions. First, we test the basic configuration, similar in nature to our training configuration, but using data collected at a different time and place. We then test the effect of obstacles between the attackers and the co-located devices and the effect of device orientation on the performance of Amigo. Subsequently, we experiment with more sophisticated attacker scenarios, and explore having the user generate localised entropy in order to improve accuracy. Next, we investigate the effect that heterogeneous hardware has on the accuracy of Amigo. Finally, we analyse the entropy of the radio signatures used in our experiments.
Data collection
We collected WiFi traces using a testbed consisting of six laptop computers (three ThinkPad, two Dell and one Toshiba), all equipped with Orinoco Gold WiFi cards. WiFi is a practical technology for evaluating Amigo, since it is increasingly prevalent. At 2.4 GHz, a few centimeters can make a difference in a multi-path channel, but in our experience the differences in the radio environment observed by nodes separated by greater distances tend to dominate these smaller dissimilarities.
Two laptops that were playing the role of the co-located devices were positioned 5 cm apart in an opposite orientation, so that their WiFi cards would be located as close as possible. Four additional laptops positioned 1, 3, 5 and 10 m away from the co-located laptops were playing the roles of malicious devices. We felt that these distances would provide a good indication of the ability of the algorithm to differentiate adversaries at various distances. Whereas most of our experiments only consider the devices positioned 5 cm apart to be co-located, we explore stretching this distance to 1 m in Section 4.8.
In our experiments, we simultaneously switch the WiFi cards on all laptops into a monitor mode and capture packets overheard by the cards. The WiFi drivers on all laptops were modified not to discard corrupted packets, but simply mark the packets as corrupted.
An active scan for WiFi access points in the lab environment where data collection took place reveals 11 access points on average. With a 10 minute trace taken in the afternoon, each laptop captured between 30,000 and 50,000 packets (including all WiFi beacons, etc.) and heard between 45 and 58 unique transmitters. The majority of transmitters heard in this environment were not loquacious -each laptop captured less than 100 packets from most sources. Figure 3 shows the packets received by two co-located devices and non co-located devices over a period of 1 s. The y axis represents the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) value associated with each packet. The packets marked by '+' were received by only one of the two laptops, while packets connected by lines were received by both laptops. For the co-located pair, during this time period approximately 85% of the packets received were common to both. For the distant pair, only 40% of the packets were common. Comparing the figures also immediately makes apparent the similarity of RSSI values for the co-located pair. 
Training the classifier
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, the classifier must be trained. For this purpose, we used a MultiBoost (Webb, 2000) algorithm with decision stumps (single node decision trees) as its base learner. The MultiBoost algorithm is a decision committee technique that combines AdaBoost (Freund and Schapire, 1996) with wagging. This approach has been shown to be more effective in reducing error than either of its constituent techniques (Webb, 2000) . The MultiBoost algorithm selects the appropriate set of weighted linear classifiers that are used for the margin calculation for each valid instance. For training, we captured 10 min worth of packets on all six laptops. We aligned and sliced all packet sequences captured by each pair of laptops in our testbed, and then extracted features from all pairs of sequences that included the first co-located laptop. We trained our classifier using 596 instances from co-located devices and 2279 instances from non co-located devices.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the classifier, we investigate its performance in terms of false positive and false negative rates. False positives occur when the algorithm predicts that the devices are co-located when they are in fact not, and the false positive rate is the number of false positives divided by the total number of non co-located instances. False negatives occur when the algorithm predicts that the devices are not co-located when they in fact are, and false negative rate is the number of false negatives divided by the total number of co-located instances. Note that in general, reducing false positives is ultimately more important that reducing false negatives because confusing a malicious device for a co-located device is a more serious flaw than not admitting the co-located device and requiring the user to wait for a longer period before the devices pair.
Training the classifier with all available features achieves 23 false negatives out of 596 true instances and 50 false positives out of 2279 instances. Although we computed dozens of features, only four were selected by the MultiBoost algorithm during training: the mean absolute difference in signal strength (signal:abs), the mean exponential difference in signal strength (signal:exp), the euclidean difference between signal strength vectors (signal:eucl) and the euclidean difference between exponential signal strength deltas (signalexp:diff:eucl). These are the features shown in Table 1 .
The base case
After training the classifier, we collected a second set of data for testing our technique. To allow time for the radio environment to evolve, the testing data set was collected two months after the training data set was collected. To prevent the classifier from recognising any anomalies with the particular physical arrangement of devices, the collection setup was moved from one end of our lab to the other (approximately 10 m). Besides changing the location and time of collecting the testing data, the experimental setup was left unchanged -two co-located laptops were positioned 5 cm apart and four other laptops were positioned 1, 3, 5 and 10 m away from the co-located laptops. All laptops were positioned at the same height and the attackers had a line of sight to the co-located devices, a likely best-case scenario for the attackers.
We tested the ability of our classifier to authenticate co-located devices and reject non co-located device as a function of the classifier's window size. Since we are using 1 s segments, the window size represents the amount of time, in seconds, that a user needs to wait to authenticate the devices. Figure 4(a) plots the false positive rates of attackers trying to authenticate while located 1, 3, 5 and 10 m away, while Figure 4 (b) plots the false negative rate of not authenticating a co-located device located 5 cm away. The results show that in 5 s both the false negative rate falls to zero, meaning that all attempts of the co-located device to authenticate are successful. 
The euclidean difference between exponential signal strength deltas
In the same 5 s, the false positive rate falls to zero for the attackers located 3, 5 and 10 m away, meaning that the attacks initiated from at least 3 m away were all unable to fool the system. Unfortunately, the attacker device that is located 1 m away is able to convince the other device that it is co-located. Since more than 60% of instances from the attacker 1 m away are incorrectly classified as co-located, increasing the window size results in aggregation of a larger proportion of these instances in every window and consequentially a more consistent misclassification of the attacker. To prevent attackers as close as 1 m from succeeding, we explored a technique that we proposed (Varshavsky et al., 2007) to generate localised entropy in the radio environment. The user that suspects that a possible attacker may be nearby simply needs to wave their hand in front of the antennas of the two mobile devices during the pairing. This motion will generate unique fluctuations in the radio environment perceived only by the co-located devices. We tested the effect of hand waving on the ability of the 1 m away attacker to authenticate with a device. In this case, the false positive rate of the attacker falls to zero within 5 s. Hand waving is a natural and non-burdensome action for users to perform in order to pair devices. To provide a more secure pairing, users can be encouraged to move around and use their preferred hand motions as if invoking some form of personal sorcery by casting a pairing spell.
The limits of handwaving
In the previous section, we showed that our handwaving technique works well in the case where the distance between the attacker and the friendly devices is 1 m. To test whether handwaving continues to work when the attacker is even closer, we collected additional traces in a new location with the attacker at a distances of 1, 0.5, 0.2 and 0.05 m from the friendly devices. Figure 5 shows the false positive rate after 10 s for the four attacker distances. The results show that at 1 m and 0.5 m handwaving works well, with not a single pairing attempt by the attacker being successful. At 0.2 m, the attacker is able to pair with one of the co-located devices in 2% of his attempts and at 0.05 m, 40% of his attempts are successful. We believe that this is possibly because the attacker is so close that the handwaving affects the signals received by both the attacker and the friendly devices in similar ways.
The effect of margin threshold
Recall that the classifier assigns a margin to each valid instance which is compared to a threshold in order to determine a vote. Increasing this threshold makes the classifier less likely to accept the devices as co-located, increasing the chance of a false negative but also decreasing the chance of a false positive. Reducing the threshold has the opposite effect. Figure 6 plots the false negative and false positive rates for all individual segments as a function of this margin threshold. As the margin threshold grows, fewer segments belonging to impostors are authenticated and as a consequence the rate of false positives falls. The jumps in the false positive and false negative rates result from the finite number of values that the margin can take, since it is the sum of a finite number of constants. Setting the margin threshold to a value beyond eight results in no attackers being authenticated, but also in no co-located devices being authenticated, in which case the false negative rate rises to one. The plateau between the margin threshold of 2-8 seems to consistently strike a good balance between false positives and false negatives. We used a margin threshold of four for all our experiments.
Figure 6
The false positive and false negative rates for different margin thresholds (see online version for colours)
The effect of obstacles
In all the experiments described above, the attacker had a clear line of sight to the co-located devices. In reality, that might not be the case as different kinds of materials may block or obstruct the path between the attacker and the target. We looked at the effect of three common materials blocking the line of sight between the attacker and co-located devices, including drywall, concrete and a human body. Table 2 summarises our findings in terms of false positives. For the attacker 1 m away and with a 5 s window, the false positive rate is about 80% as was shown in Figure 4 (a). In contract, when the attacker is separated from the co-located devices by two sheets of gypsum drywall, a wall about 10 cm thick, the false positive rate climbs to one. This has the implication that drywall does not protect users from an attacker who is immediately behind the wall. This is in line with other signal propagation studies that have shown that dry wall does not have a profound effect on radio signal propagation in the 2.4 GHz range (Stone, 1997) . When a human being is standing between the the attacker and the two co-located laptops located 1 m away, the false positive rate falls to just above 10%. This is encouraging, as it means that humans, being basically bags of water, by just the sheer blocking of the authentication with their bodies, may make it significantly more secure. Finally, when a 30 cm-thick concrete wall separates the attacker from the co-located devices, the false positive rate is zero. When passing through a concrete wall, radio signals attenuate strongly enough to make it extremely hard for the simple attacker to authenticate without more sophisticated attacks.
The effect of device orientation
We investigated the effect that the orientation of the co-located devices has on the accuracy of Amigo. We experimented with three different laptop orientations:
• opposite -the two laptops are positioned in the opposite directions such that their WiFi cards are in front of each other
• adjacent -the two laptops are adjacent to each other
• stacked -the two laptops are stacked one on top of the other.
We collected an additional set of testing traces using all three orientations at the same location where we collected the training traces. We chose the same location to minimise the number of variables effecting our results.
Recall that the base classifier was built with two co-located laptops positioned in the opposite orientation. Table 3 summarises our findings in terms of false positives after 10 s for an attacker located 1 m away from the co-located devices. For both the opposite and adjacent orientations, the false positive rate is 0%, and for the stacked orientation the false positive rate is 14%. We believe that the stacked orientation performs worse because the WiFi card of the upper laptop partially obstructs the WiFi card of the lower laptop, causing signal attenuation. Overall, this result is encouraging because it suggests that the orientation of the co-located devices might have only a small effect on the accuracy of Amigo. 
Stretching co-location
Up until now, we used a classifier trained with data that indicated that two devices were co-located if they were 5 cm apart. In this section, we study the effects of extending the notion of co-location to include devices located up to 1 m away. We retrained our classifier on the same training data, but this time we marked the segments belonging to the device located 1 m away as also co-located. Figure 7 (a) and (b) plot the false positive and false negative rates as a function of time the user needs to wait to authenticate the devices. The results show that after 5 s the false positive rate falls to zero for all attackers located 3 m or more away, while the false negative rate falls to 5%. This means that in 5% of cases a user will not succeed to pair co-located devices in 5 s from the first attempt, and will need to retry again. However, waiting for 20 s always results in a correct pairing.
Sophisticated attacks
A powerful attacker may have surveyed the location where the two legitimate devices are attempting to pair, and could attempt to use this knowledge to convince the legitimate devices that he is currently present at that particular location. We implemented a simulated powerful attacker for the purpose of evaluating the robustness of our system under such a threat. We conducted an experiment in which the attacker had access to a distribution of received signal strength measurements for each radio source, sampled by the target device itself at the pairing location only a few hours prior to the current authentication. During the authentication, when the attacker receives a packet from a radio source that he has observed before, he substitutes the signal strength value in this packet with a sample from the recorded distribution of packets previously observed at the pairing location from that transmitter. Whenever the attacker receives a packet from a source that he has no distribution for, the attacker has a choice of either pretending he never received the packet in the first place, thereby potentially decreasing the percent of common packets if the target device did get this packet, or simply leaving the signal strength in the packet as is. Experiments showed that not discarding these packets is beneficial to the attacker. Figure 8 shows that attackers located 1 m and 5 m away can successfully authenticate in 45% and 15% of the cases using 5 s windows, respectively. The adversary positioned 5 m away actually performed better in our experiments than the laptop positioned 3 m away, due to the fact that the laptop at a distance of 5 m generally shared a slightly larger number of packets with the target. The laptops positioned 3 m and 10 m away were not able to authenticate because a large portion of their instances were rejected due to insufficient common packets before moving to the second stage of classification. In order to defend against the attacker who has gone to the measure of rigorously surveying the environment in this way, we propose to use the hand waving enhancement discussed earlier. Even equipped with a location-specific distribution, the system has a false positive rate of zero within all 5 s windows of the experiment for all attackers.
In a worst-case scenario, an attacker could also be powerful enough to have complete control over the radio environment. We assume that such an attacker has injected every packet into the environment, and that he knows exactly what packets the target device receives. Also, for our simulation, the attacker is equipped with an oracle, that allows the attacker to sample from the distribution of signal strength values as perceived by the target device over the duration of the experiment. We tested whether hand waving will prevent this attacker from authenticating with the target device in this case. Figure 9 shows the false positive rate of authentications with the oracle attacker. The figure shows that with hand waving, after 5 s, the attacker is able to authenticate successfully in only 30% of the cases. If the user is willing to pair the devices for 60 s, the false positive rate falls to 0%. This is encouraging given the small likelihood of encountering an attacker this powerful. 
Different hardware
So far, we have evaluated Amigo using the same WiFi cards that we used for training the classifier. However, WiFi cards with different chipsets may perceive different signal strengths and provide RSSI values in different ranges. Therefore, the signal strength values as received by various WiFi cards need to be normalised before they can be used for authentication. This normalisation typically takes the form of a linear transformation between signal strength values as reported by various chipsets (Haeberlen et al., 2004) . We envision that such a transformation could be supplied ahead of time for every chipset.
To test the effect of heterogeneous hardware on the accuracy of Amigo, we conducted an experiment using different types of 802.11 g capable wireless interfaces: two Zydas ZD1211-based 802.11 b/g USB dongles and an Atheros-based 802.11 b/g PCMCIA card. Before starting experiments, we computed a linear mapping between signal strength values as reported by the two new cards and the Orinoco card. The mapping was computed by minimising the mean difference between sequences of signal strength values of different cards, collected simultaneously at a single location over a period of approximately 1 min.
We positioned the first USB dongle and an Atheros card 5 cm apart and the second USB dongle 2 m away. The second USB dongle played the role of an attacker, trying to authenticate to the first USB dongle. Effectively, we tested the worst case scenario, where the two nearby devices have different chipsets, but the attacker has the same hardware as the device it is trying to authenticate with. After applying the linear transformations on the signal strength sequences, we tested our classifier with the new traces. Figure 10 (a) and (b) plot the false positive and false negative rates as a function of time the user needs to wait to pair the devices. The results show that the rate of false positives falls below 5% immediately, and reaches 0% after 15 s. The rate of false negatives falls to below 10% within 10 s, and tends towards 0%. These results suggest that a simple linear transformation may be sufficient to make Amigo work with common WiFi interfaces.
Entropy calculation
In this section, we report the entropy of the radio signatures that were used for authentication in our experiments. Recall that a radio signature consists of an ordered sequence of packet hashes and associated discrete RSSI values. Note that the numbers reported are an upper bound on the entropy, meaning that the actual entropy may be lower if an attacker does not simply guess values, but uses some additional knowledge of the radio domain.
An attacker that is not physically close to the actual location where the pairing takes place will have to guess the sequence of packets in a radio signature and the RSSI value for each packet. However, blindly guessing a sequence of packet hashes will result in very large entropy. Therefore, we assume that the attacker is located somewhere nearby and therefore succeeded to guess the sequence of packets in a radio signature correctly. In this case, the attacker still needs to learn the RSSI values of packets in the radio signature.
To calculate the number of bits of entropy per second in a radio signature, we first calculate the number of bits of entropy there are per packet and then multiply it by the average number of packets per second in the signature. In our experiments, packets were received with a total of 41 different RSSI values, which results in 5.36 bits of entropy per packet. Since, on average, laptops received 160.15 packets per second, the entropy of the radio signatures is thus 858 bits per second. However, in practice, the attacker might try to guess a rough range of RSSI values per packet if he is located in a vicinity. If the attacker is able to guess the RSSI range down to ten different RSSI values or ranges, the entropy becomes 532 bits per second. Moreover, if the attacker reduces the range of the RSSI values down to five possibilities, the entropy is still 372 bits per second. Although we have established only an upper-bound on the entropy of the signatures used by Amigo, we believe that the true entropy compares favourably with that of keys used in widely-deployed authentication systems such as Bluetooth, with approximately 13 bits of entropy using a 4-digit PIN.
Related work
SWAP-CA (SWAP-CA, 1998) is a specification that gives users a way to associate devices by pressing a button on two devices simultaneously, but does not provide security. In Bluetooth, users pair devices by providing each device with a secret PIN number. While the PIN provides for device authentication, it requires active user involvement and interaction with both devices. Moreover, Bluetooth pairing has been shown to be susceptible to attack by eavesdroppers equipped with sensitive directional antennas, which enable attackers to breach the security of the system from more than a mile away (Cheung, 2005; Shaked and Wool, 2005) . LoKey (Nicholson et al., 2006) uses SMS messages as an out-of-band channel to authenticate a key exchanged over the internet. While this approach is secure, SMS delivery is slow and may incur monetary cost. Physically shaking two devices together for authentication has recently received significant attention in the research community. Smart-It (Holmquist et al., 2001) used common readings from accelerometers to establish an association between devices shaken at the same time. Mayrhofer and Gellersen (2007) extended this technique to provide secure authentication between the shaken devices. Both of these techniques use the accelerometer readings as the basis of the authentication. In Shake Them Up! (Castelluccia and Mutaf, 2005) , two devices establish a shared secret over an anonymous broadcast channel by taking turns transmitting parts of the key. Shaking the devices randomises the reception power of their packets by a potential eavesdropper and makes it hard for attackers to exploit power analysis to break the channel anonymity. Unfortunately, this approach is vulnerable to attack by an eavesdropper that exploits the differences in the baseband frequencies of the two radio sources, which result from differences in their crystal clock oscillators, to differentiate between packets sent by the two transmitters. In general, shaking techniques are easy for users to understand and when accelerometers are available, provide intuitive and reliable device pairing. The obvious drawback with shaking techniques is that there are objects such as ATM machines and vending machines that are too large or too heavy to be shaken vigorously. This inspired our hand waving technique as it does not require both objects to be shaken together and only requires hands to be waved or shaken near the antennas of the two co-located devices to generate localised entropy.
Numerous research projects have suggested the use of physically constrained channels as a means of establishing secure association between devices in close proximity. Some examples include the use of a direct electric contact (Stajano and Anderson, 1999) , infrared beacons (Balfanz et al., 2002; Smetters et al., 2006) , ultrasound (Kindberg and Zhang, 2003b) , and laser beams (Kindberg and Zhang, 2003a) . Unfortunately, physically constrained channels often require extra hardware (e.g., an extra cable), and can be susceptible to attacks by sensitive receivers that can detect dim signal refractions and reflections (Cheung, 2005; Shaked and Wool, 2005) .
Another technology that can be used for secure device pairing is Near Field Communication or NFC. Unlike radio-transmission based wireless communication like 802.11 and GSM, NFC transmits data via inductive loading. This limits the working range of NFC links to a few centimeters (NFC, 2006) . While obviously a good fit for many use cases, NFC is not without issues: like traditional radio transmissions, the range of the inductive loading can be drastically increased by eavesdropping with a large antenna -a large loop of wire in the case of NFC. It is also the case that for cultural or hygiene reasons, there are situations in which the 'almost touching' nature of NFC may be inappropriate and for which the notion of proximity may be better suited by a larger distance. Lastly, NFC does add additional cost, size and weight to a mobile device in addition to the far-field communication already present.
Another solution to establishing trust between mobile devices is to use a public key infrastructure. In this case, every mobile device is uniquely named and certified by a trusted authority. Even if the effort is spent to grant every device a unique and certified name, pairing may still require significant user involvement since there may be multiple nearby devices to choose from.
Several projects proposed to delegate the verification of whether the two intended devices have been paired to the user. McCune et al. (2005) and Saxena et al. (2006) proposed to use the visual channel for verification, while Goodrich et al. (2006) proposed to use the audio channel. Uzun et al. (2007) recently performed a comparative evaluation of a number of user-driven verification methods.
In contrast, we propose to use the common radio environment as a basis to the shared secret between co-located devices -if two devices perceive a similar radio environment they are probably very close to each other. A key advantage of our approach is that it makes use of the existing radio interfaces already present on mobile devices and does not require any additional hardware. The approach is also automatic and does not require user involvement to verify the correctness of the pairing.
Conclusions
In this paper, we showed that it is possible to securely pair devices that come within close proximity by using knowledge of dynamic characteristics of their common radio environment as proof of physical proximity. We introduced Amigo, an algorithm that extends the Diffie-Hellman key exchange with verification of device co-location. Amigo has three key advantages: it does not require additional hardware beyond the wireless interface used for normal communication, it does not require user involvement to verify the pairing, and it is not susceptible to eavesdropping.
We evaluated Amigo using WiFi-enabled laptops and showed that within 5 s it is possible to recognise attackers located as close as 3 m away from the co-located laptops. However, if the user is willing to wave their hands in front of the antennas of the two co-located devices in order to generate some localised entropy, Amigo is resilient to an attacker located 1 m away, even in the unlikely case of an attacker that controls all ambient radio sources and is using the signal strength values from a distribution collected at the exact location of the current pairing.
